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Although there are several interpretations of it, heroism is generally viewed in terms of 
distinguished bravery or courage. However, little has been done to investigate how people 
perceive heroic acts and the hero's reasons for them. There would appear to be a risky 
response prompted by a relatively sudden emotional trigger, the individual also being likely to 
act without processing cognitive information about risk and without necessarily considering 
the costs and benefits associated with the behaviour. Using short scenarios, 155 subjects 
assessed the mental processes involved at the critical points of perceived acts of heroism. The 
findings suggest that perceived heroism relates to intention and outcome rather than the risk 
involved. The findings are discussed in terms of attribution and risk perception and a three-
dimensional approach is proposed which incorporates affect, cognition and control.   
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Introduction 
 
The literature on heroism is wide and varied, covering everything from the interpretation 
of heroism in medieval literature through to post traumatic stress disorder in soldiers in 
recent wars; it also covers different roles within heroism, such as admired celebrities and 
noble stances taken or work done by people such as medical staff treating people with 
SARS (Reid 2005). In addition, acts that may be thought heroic are also apparent in the 
literature relating to courage, bravery and altruism.  
 
Chambers Concise Dictionary (1992 p 484) defines a hero as a man (for heroine, 
woman) ‘of distinguished bravery, any illustrious person, a person who is reverenced and 
idealised' before going on to refer to the principal male figure in films, stories, drama etc.. 
'Heroic' adds reference to supreme courage and elaborate means to reach a desired result 
such as the preserving of life. For this paper we ignore the film/story role and take the 
commonly held view that heroism is doing something that is courageous, may be 
hazardous to the person but which is intended to help others and even saves lives. 
However, there are many anecdotal stories, covering a diverse range of situations and 
issues, of heroic people making risky decisions which may involve them in no apparent 
personal gain and even in a clear personal loss; do we judge the hero differently if their 
heroic act ends in failure, or if they risk their own life in the process? 
 
Heroism can be viewed as a highly moral behaviour that has been explained as a form 
of sensation-seeking, altruism, citizenship and bravery and as a desirable but sometimes 
non-adaptive response in Darwinian terms. All these behaviours seem to involve some sort 
of emotional trigger and usually a rapid response. This paper involves an empirical 
investigation whereby subjects assess the mental processes involved at the critical points 
of perceived acts of heroism. The findings are analysed from an attributional perspective 
and we suggest three levels of judgement, taking into account emotion and affect, risk 
awareness and perceived control.  
 
The value of heroism 
                                                 
*
  Corresponding author. Email Joan.Harvey@ncl.ac.uk 
2 
 
Heroism is apparently non-adaptive in Darwinian terms, so why does it exist? Historically, 
risk-taking and heroism have been considered to be predominantly male tendencies; most 
recognized acts of heroism were performed by males, although the heroic actions 
themselves may be more equally distributed between the genders but less nominated or 
reported (Johnson 2002; Becker and Eagly 2004). Research shows that women prefer risk-
prone brave males to risk-averse non-brave males, and that men are aware of this 
preference (Kelly and Dunbar 2001). The Kelly and Dunbar study also found that altruism 
has value only over the longer term, and is not perceived as important in the evolution of 
heroism as bravery and a demonstrated willingness to take risks. An evolutionary view of 
why most heroes that have achieved public recognition tend to be men is supported by the 
fact that males tend to judge risks as smaller and less problematic than do women (Slovic 
2000), and indeed those social roles that require risk-taking actions (e.g. fire fighters) are 
more likely to be occupied by men. Although heroism can be costly and sometimes non-
adaptive, it could be argued that men have learned to take risks more than women as a 
result of sexual selection (Eagly and Crowley, 1986).  
 
Heroism may not only have a direct value to the individual in moral and self-esteem 
terms: admiration for heroes can form the basis for a civic identity, fostering active 
citizenship (Kelly 1997).  In other words, heroism endows the society as well as the 
individuals involved with positive values and culture. One form of heroism is 'courageous 
resistance', defined as a voluntary selfless behaviour in which there is significantly high 
risk or cost to the individual and possibly their family and associates; not all altruistic 
people will exhibit this, and those who do are not always courageous (Shepela 1999). 
 
Are heroes different to the rest of us, or is it just the circumstances at the time? 
Sensation-seeking behaviour is associated with heroism: it has played a significant role in 
both performance during war and in relation to long term adjustment subsequently - the 
troops high on sensation-seeking behaviour were able to adjust in later years (Neria et al. 
2000).  It is also likely that heroism is also associated with higher moral values and ethics 
(Shepela 1999). 
 
The most obvious examples of heroism in recent years have been the actions of 
emergency services in various disasters such as "9/11" in New York.  One explanation of 
such highly altruistic behaviour is that of Margolis (1982), who suggests that within each 
of us, there are two 'selves'- one selfish (S) and the other group-orientated (G), and the 
individual follows a Darwinian rule for allocating the resources between the selves.  
Margolis describes how the balance between G and S changes during what he terms 'social 
actions' for example during a disaster. The fact that someone may put their own life 
seriously into jeopardy in order to save a stranger is explained by an increase in G such 
that he perceives that other group members might consider his behaviour and the example 
it sets as being beneficial to the development of the group and society. Thus, S is almost 
overpowered by G at the instant that the life-saver makes the decision to act so 
altruistically.  
 
Prosocial behaviours: altruism and heroism 
 
Altruism is one way of looking at heroism, and there are several theories trying to explain 
this. These are based on reasons for altruism, which may ethical hedonism (egoism, 
because it provides some personal benefit), genuine (assist for no personal benefit), kin 
(gene transmission reasons) and reciprocal (future benefits may exceed short term cost of 
helping); from these reason various theories- biological, behaviourist, cognitive, 
psychodynamic and humanistic- have emerged (Glassman and Hadad, 2004). The 
biological or evolutionary approach tends to emphasise kin, moral virtues or reciprocal 
altruism as benefiting reproductive success or survival (Miller, 2007); the behaviourist 
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approach is also based on ethical hedonism but the underlying benefits are seen in terms of 
reinforcers rather than survival; the cognitive approach tends to focus on imitation and 
vicarious learning by observation. The psychodynamic approach tends to contrast with the 
cognitive one as it emphasises altruism as a defence mechanism that is intended to block 
one's own aggressive nature. The humanistic approach, which derives from the work of 
Carl Rogers and takes a positive view that altruism is self-actualising and may stem from 
empathy with the person who needs help; Rogers stated that 'It is the meaning of the 
decision which is essential to understanding the act' (Rogers, 1969, p 268), which is 
perhaps fundamental to understanding heroic acts. Maslow's theory would imply that self-
actualised individuals are more likely to engage in consistent acts of altruism (Maslow 
1943), although there is little evidence to support this implication.  
 
Staub (1972) suggests that 'spontaneous helping' is the result of a strong motive or 
personal goal. If a hero rescues someone they do not know, then reciprocity cannot be the 
motive; however heroes collecting awards for their acts have been known to cite religious 
or ethical principles and empathic concern as their motivation; it is not clear in any of 
these cases just how much of this is post hoc rationale rather than a real reflection of their 
motives at the time (Johnson 2002). Shepala (1999) describes courageous resistance as a 
subset of altruistic behaviour, differing from risky bystander intervention that he describes 
as heroism, by being sustained and more deliberative. It is unlikely that personality 
characteristics, such as empathy, alone are sufficient to explain why some people behave 
courageously when given the opportunity to do so, and it is more likely that a willingness 
to see people as similar to themselves may be a better explanation (Staub 1989).  
 
Low levels of altruism have been associated (along with high levels of sensation-
seeking, irresponsibility, anxiety and aggression, and more likely to be men than women) 
with being identified as high-risk groups in traffic, and such high risk groups are least 
likely to appreciate traffic safety campaigns (Ulleberg 2001). However some heroes, such 
as fire fighters and police officers commended for bravery, have been found to have high 
scores for sensation seeking (Fischer and Smith 2004). Examples of altruism can be found 
in the animal world, where (to use Margolis' terminology) some G behaviours, such as 
signalling threats to the whole group, have no cost to the individual and considerable 
benefit to the group. Other G behaviours enable animals to hunt in packs. However in 
humans, some altruistic behaviours are clearly not in the best interests of the individual 
and are more difficult to explain in a rational sense, unless one places a value on the 
altruistic behaviour itself as, for example, good citizenship (see for example, the concept 
of communitarianism by Etzioni). 
 
Although not strictly altruism or selfishness, investigations into self-sacrificial 
decisions for the sake of fairness demonstrate that the fairness motive and moral concerns 
can influence decisions that have economic impact; these decisions may involve both 
punishment and reward of someone who has demonstrated a prior intent to be either fair or 
unfair to another person (Turillo et al. 2002).   
 
Heroism, risk and the level of threat 
 
Latane and Darley (1970) proposed a decision tree model of helping which suggests that 
first the person must notice and interpret the situation as an emergency, secondly they will 
be influenced by the amount of people present (the bystander effect) and action will be 
taken once responsibility has been accepted and the bystander feels they are capable of 
offering assistance (Small and Loewenstein, 2003). Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine 
many self-sacrificial behaviours being calculated in this way where time may be limited 
and it seems much more plausible that these are prompted by a trigger such as the situation 
being perceived to be reaching a critical point. The triangle model of responsibility 
(Schlenker, Weigold and Schlenker 2008) proposes three conditions to explain when and 
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why someone becomes engaged with tasks or events: a clear set of prescriptions seen as 
applicable, the actor being bound by those prescriptions and appearing to have control over 
relevant events; these may be relevant to how people perceive heroes if they make 
assumptions about their moral values or prescriptions. 
 
The level of threat may well be more important than the number of people affected in 
a risky situation; this would accord with the view taken by Slovic that affect and impulse 
are more important in making the very quick decision to act rather than the cognitive 
processing of information, implying that perception of heroism relates to the intention and 
outcome rather than the risk involved to the hero or numbers of people affected by the 
threat (VanHoutven, 1997; Slovic et al., 1985; Harvey and Erdos 2003). Rationalization of 
the risk by the hero or observer might involve post hoc social amplification of the risks 
taken, especially where the heroic act was successful in terms of outcome and was 
dramatized by the media; however it is possible than an unsuccessful outcome might serve 
to attenuate the perceived risk (Kasperson et al. 2000). If the outcome contains high 
personal and sentimental elements, the interpretation of the observer may also be subject 
to social amplification, in the same way that personal and sentimental appeals raise 
charitable giving (Small, Loewenstein and Slovic 2007). The outcome may be observed 
differently by people with different moral values, such as their level of integrity and in 
terms of whether the hero is perceived to have acted in an ethical way (Schlenker, Weigold 
and Schlenker 2008). 
 
Other triggered non-rational risky behaviours  
 
Heroism is not the only non-rational risky behaviour undertaken without much cognitive 
processing of risk or considering the risks and benefits assumed by many risk-taking 
theorists.  
 
Retaliatory behaviour has been studied in recent years from a consumer perspective; it 
can be defined as aggressive behaviour, but done with the intention to get even, thus 
making it an equity issue (Huefner and Hunt 2000). It has been observed that retaliation is 
a natural aspect of behaviour, performed when people lack better means of restoring equity 
(Demore, Fisher and Baron 1988). Richins and Verhage (1987) found aggression and 
assertion to be statistically independent but did find a correlation between pleasure in 
seeking redress and aggression. Although retaliation can be analysed in terms of 
Hirschmann's Exit-Voice-Loyalty theory (1970, 1986), it may actually be more 
emotionally and impulse- driven than Exit and Voice responses. It can be proposed that 
retaliatory behaviour is almost always impulsive, showing a lack of control and of risk 
awareness.  
 
Another form of potentially impulse-driven behaviour is driving: Porter and Berry 
(2001) reported 20% of drivers "red light running"; in another self-selected sample, 30- 
40% (according to age) of respondents admitted to getting into confrontations with other 
drivers, with 30- 45% admitting retaliatory driving behaviour (roadragers.com 2001). As 
with other risk-prone behaviours, the group most likely to use retaliation as a response or 
drive aggressively was young men.  
 
These behaviours incorporate elements of impulsiveness, lack of control and lack of 
risk awareness and the association of risky behaviours with personality and emotions is 
also clear in these studies. However, a difficulty here is that personality is relatively stable, 
enduring and probably hard-wired, whilst emotions are transient and variable, so it is 
likely that the interaction between the two is an important area on which to focus research.   
 
Summary and hypotheses 
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Heroism can be summarised as being clearly emotional, unplanned, risky, often admired 
and as having an altruistic value in most cases, whilst being potentially maladaptive in 
Darwinian terms for both the individual and the group. The cognitive processes probably 
mainly relate to the fast responses to act that are required and are unlikely to involve any 
major assessment or risk, to the extent that there may be no awareness of the risk or an 
underestimation.  It is also likely to be related to certain personality characteristics, but 
these may differ according to the nature of the heroic behaviour- including impulsiveness, 
sensation-seeking, anxiety and aggression. In terms of all the above, heroism may have 
several factors in common with other non-rational risky behaviours which have no positive 
values associated with them, such as retaliatory behaviours. What underlie these are the 
impulsive nature of the response and often a lack of risk awareness. 
 
Little has been done to investigate heroism from the perspective of the onlooker or 
judge, and to do this would entail the consideration of the different types of heroic 
behaviour as reflected in the literature, where different types and levels of risk may be 
apparent and where the hero is a professional or lay person. We are interested here not in 
the heroes’ own attributions for their behaviour, which are difficult to assess as reasons 
given at the time may not correspond to the post hoc attributions, but in the perception of 
members of the public to what they see or read about as heroic acts, and to what they 
attribute the actions.  
 
The perceived personality characteristics of the hero such as sensation seeking or 
impulsivity may influence the perception of the risky or heroic behaviour in particular 
situations, as would any perceived personal or sentimental elements and number of people 
affected (VanHoutven 1997; Harvey and Erdos 2003; Slovic et al. 1985; Small, 
Loewenstein and Slovic 2007); all of these could lead to differential social amplifications 
of risk. Thus, hypothesis 1 can be stated as 
 
H1: different situations will be perceived differently according to level of risk, 
awareness of risk and impulsivity and emotional involvement. 
 
The literature on altruism could lead us to propose that bystanders, such as neighbours 
or members of the public might have different motives to act than professionals 
(Staub1972; Johnson 2002;  Shepela 1999). In addition, the literature on decision-trees in 
appraising risky situations would imply that trained professionals may take a more 
considered and less emotional decision to act (Latane and Darley 1970; Small and 
Loewenstein 2003). Thus hypothesis 2 can be stated as: 
 
H2: the trained professionals will be perceived as more aware of the risk and less 
emotionally involved. 
 
Whilst there is evidence from studies on the attractiveness of moral virtues in 
advertising good genetic quality for mate selection and that men may judge risks as 
smaller than do women (Slovic 2000; Eagly and Crowley 1986; Glassman and Hadad 
2004; Miller 2007), other studies (e.g. Schlenker, Weigold and Schlenker 2008) show no 
gender differences in perception of ethical or heroic acts. So hypothesis 3 is: 
 
H3: the gender of the perceiver will be unrelated to the perception of the male hero.  
 
Methodology 
 
In order to evaluate how people perceive heroism and risk-taking, five short scenarios 
(length 116- 213 words each) were compiled from real examples of heroism that had 
appeared in recent newspapers or on news bulletins. These were selected to cover 
situations of varying levels of perceived threat and prior training of the hero:  
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1. Untrained but fit and athletic lay-person helping to stop a fight in a pub in which a 
friend was involved.  Hero was knifed in process. 
2. Martial-arts trained lay person helping stranger who is being mugged by a man 
wielding a knife.  Hero is knifed in the process. 
3. Untrained life- saving of neighbours and children from a burning house. 
4. Professional policeman seriously injured while apprehending street criminal when 
off-duty. 
5. Professional fire-fighter at work volunteering to act in dangerous explosive 
situation; severely injured in process. 
 
All of the heroes were described as male in order to avoid any attributions of heroism 
purely on the grounds of gender. Eight questions were asked of each scenario; these 
covered the extent to which the 'hero' in each scenario was perceived:   
 
a. to influence the outcome,  
b. to act on impulse,  
c. to be aware of the risk,  
d. to be sensible in their actions , 
e. how much the respondent admired the hero,  
f. strength of emotional feeling when he acted 
g. how much the risk was worth taking, 
h. what were the hero's motives (open-ended question) 
 
All questions except h, which was open-ended, used an end- anchored scale from 0 to 
10; for example, the scale for influencing the outcome ranged from 0- no influence at all to 
10- major influence. 
 
A sample of 155 respondents in the United Kingdom were chosen opportunistically 
with the intention of maximising demographic variation by sex, age and socio-economic 
status. Of those who provided demographic information, 50 were men and 98 women, 52 
were in professional occupations, 30 were working in other jobs, 43 were students and 5 
were retired or unemployed. The age range was from 18 to 86, with a mean of 32.4 years. 
 
The five scenarios with their accompanying questions and a short preamble explaining 
their origin in real events were presented in written form to each respondent.  
 
Results 
 
The 7 quantitative questions' descriptive data are given in Table 1, along with a 
classification of the heroes. It can be seem that the lay people (scenarios 1, 2 and 3) were 
most likely to be regarded as acting on impulse, the off-duty policeman less so, and the 
fire-fighter least of all. 
 
 
Table 1: means and s.d.s for 7 quantitative questions for 5 scenarios; highest and lowest means for b-g in italics 
scenario 1 pub  
fight 
2 stranger 
mugged 
3 burning 
 house 
4 police/ 
 criminal 
5 fire- 
fighter 
question mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
           
a influence outcome 7.84 1.4 7.71 1.6 7.72 1.8 7.63 1.8 7.79 1.4 
b acted on impulse 6.95 2.3 7.38 1.9 7.76 2.1 5.61 2.8 4.37 2.6 
c aware of risk 3.87 2.0 6.24 2.5 6.19 2.7 4.68 2.6 8.18 1.7 
d admire hero 6.05 2.1 7.97 1.6 8.90 1.3 5.41 2.4 7.49 2.0 
e foolhardy 5.32 2.0 5.62 109 5.12 2.4 6.40 2.4 5.47 2.2 
f strength of emotion 7.09 1.8 6.89 1.9 8.27 1.7 5.28 2.3 6.11 2.3 
g risk worth taking 5.04 2.2 6.45 2.0 8.05 1.9 3.47 2.7 5.50 2.5 
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Hero: lay or professional Lay Lay Lay Prof Prof 
Hero: trained or not Some  Yes  None Yes  Yes 
Hero: level of injury Medium Unknown Medium Severe  Very severe 
           
 
 
In terms of awareness of risk, the fire-fighter is predictably most aware, but two of the 
lay people are perceived as more so than the policeman. The admiration is greatest for the 
lay-person who saved his neighbours from a burning house; this person is also seen as 
acting with the strongest emotion at the time, and that this constituted the greatest risk 
worth taking.  The ratings for the off-duty policeman reflect the least admiration, strength 
of emotion and the risk worth taking along with the most foolhardiness and the firefighter 
was judged to be most aware of the risk and least likely to have acted on impulse.  
 
Each of the seven quantitative questions was compared across the five scenarios using 
Friedman 1-way ANOVAs, which are presented in Table 2. These yielded highly 
significant findings for all the questions except question a, with all others except 
foolhardiness having chi-squared values at very extreme levels, indicating a massive 
difference in judgements. Table 2 shows very clearly that the most heroic in terms of 
influencing the outcome, acting on impulse, admiration for the hero, risk worth taking and 
his perceived strength of feeling is the man in scenario 3 who rescued his neighbours. The 
two professionals clearly fared less well than the heroic lay-people, both scoring 
significantly lower than the other three for being less judged to have acted on impulse with 
z= 4.62 p<.0001 and these incidents involving less strength of emotion with z= 4.58 
p<.0001; these findings provide support for H2.  
 
In terms of H1, these findings provide unequivocal support for the heroism 
judgements differing across different scenarios except for whether the hero believed he 
could influence the outcome and for H2 support is provided with the clear differences 
between the perceptions of the professionals and others. 
 
 
Table 2: Friedman 1-way ANOVAs for 7 questions across 5 scenarios 
   
           mean ranks for each scenario 
 
    question 
        Χ2       p scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5 
        
a influence outcome      1.94            n.s. 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.0 
b acted on impulse  170.15        <.0001 3.3 3.5 3.8 2.5 1.9 
c aware of risk  257.22        <.0001 1.8 3.3 3.2 2.4 4.3 
d admire hero  304.67        <.0001 2.1 3.5 4.3 1.8 3.2 
e foolhardy    38.00        <.0001 2.7    3.0 2.7 3.6 3.0 
f strength of emotion  193.81        <.0001 3.1 3.2 4.2 1.9 2.6 
 
 
 
Sex differences in the 7 quantitative questions were tested for all five scenarios using 
35 Mann-Whitney U tests, yielding only two that were significant (question g, scenario 1, 
and question b scenario 3, with z= 1.960, p=.0500, and z= 2.063 p=.0392 respectively, 
both 2-tailed); these were in the direction that women would rate the risk as more 
worthwhile and more impulsive; however only 2 significant results out of 35 suggest that 
these are likely to be type I errors, so it can be concluded that the gender of the perceiver is 
irrelevant to their perception of the heroic behaviour, thus supporting H3.  
 
Multiple regression analyses for all five scenarios with admire the hero as the 
dependent variable and the other ratings as independent variables show the risk being 
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worth taking is a significant predictor for all five scenarios; however the strength of 
emotion was a strong negative predictor for scenarios 4 and 5 whereas awareness of the 
risk was significant only for scenarios 2 and 4. Table 3 shows the results for scenario 4, 
where the highest R2 was obtained. When ratings from the other scenarios were added into 
the regression equation for admire the hero for scenario 4, this rose to R2=.670, suggesting 
the possibility of a halo effect. However such an effect could not be due to a fixed order of 
presentation as the scenario order was randomised for more than half the subjects and no 
order effects had been found for those with identical presentation order.  
 
These results suggest that the level of threat posed to the lives of others rather than the 
perception of the actual risk taken or the injury received as part of the heroic act is the 
most potent issue in whether people are perceived to be heroic. If the mean ranks were 
aggregated to yield an overall heroism "score", scenario 3 would be the highest, followed 
by scenario 2, with scenario 4 being perceived as least heroic; this is also reflected in the 
qualitative analysis.   
 
 
Table 3:  Regression analysis for scenario 4 
Rating T value Prob Beta 
Influence outcome   2.14   .0343  .182 
Act on impulse   1.66   .0992  .103 
Aware of risk   3.02   .0030  .185 
Being sensible in acting  -4.56 <.0001 -.350 
Strength of emotional feeling   1.71   .0894  .131 
Risk worth taking   3.42   .0008  .070 
 
   
F (6, 146) = 15.27, p<.0001. R= .618, R2= .382 
  
 
 
The final question was qualitative and in order to analyse this the comments from the 
questionnaires were coded using a content analysis method to identify key words; these are 
summarised in Table 4.  
 
Table 4:  Summary of key words used to describe the hero's motives to act 
   scenario   
key word   1   2   3   4   5 
avoid escalation   66 12     0   1   0 
save a life     2 87 123   2 30 
impress/look brave   17 11     9 13 28 
just doing the job     0   3     1 70 70 
good citizen/help friend 105 47   18 16 25 
aware of the risk    0   3     1   2 23 
underestimated the risk    8   3     1 15   2 
impulse    1   6   16   1   1 
believed experience could influence    6 11     7   9 20 
justice/crime or disaster prevention    0 12     0 36 23 
empathy, identifies with victim    1   1   10   0   0 
 
 
From Table 4, it can be seen that attributions are different according to whether the 
hero is perceived to be a professional and just doing their jobs, presumably paid to take the 
risks, providing qualitative support to H2. Saving lives was the predominant response to 
scenarios 2 and 3, where there is some visible threat (a knife or a fire); scenario 5 did not 
explicitly state whether lives were at risk, although the dread risk was clearly high in this 
situation from the public's point of view. An interesting finding is the number of times the 
action was attributed to attempting to look brave or impress colleagues or bystanders; this 
is especially true about the fire-fighter in scenario 5, where peer pressure to volunteer and 
impressing colleagues were emphasised in addition to the notion that the hero was simply 
doing their job. 
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Discussion 
 
The findings from the study lend support to the perception of heroism being related to the 
perceived intention and the outcome, especially in affective terms, rather than the 
perceived risk taken. In all of the scenarios, the heroic behaviour was in reality an 
impulsive response to a particular situation, yet in two of those scenarios the responses 
were judged to be less impulsive because the behaviour was perceived as job performance, 
or even motivated by the desire to impress (Latane and Darley, 1970). This latter reason is 
consistent with the research that suggests that men are aware of a preference by women for 
risk-prone brave men (Kelly & Dunbar, 2001), but our findings of no sex differences, 
especially in terms of admiration or attribution of impressing/bravery as a motive, would 
not support this view.  
 
In scenarios 1, 2, 4 and 5, the outcome was deleterious to the hero, as they were 
injured.  In contrast, the most successful heroic act involved children, known to the hero. It 
is therefore difficult to tease apart whether the ‘risk worth taking’ judgements were 
determined by the injury to the hero or to the emotive appeal of rescuing children; 
however both of these reasons are outcomes, therefore implying that the risk worth taking 
judgement is outcome-based but differentiated according to the perception of the 
profession as one involving risk estimates.  
 
There would seem to be an element of high moral values and good citizenship in the 
findings here; scenario 3 in particular would support the Margolis (1982) explanation of a 
G behaviour overpowering the S one, as would scenario 4, although perhaps to a lesser 
extent and this can be considered to be consistent with the findings of Schlenker et al 
(2008).  There is also the issue that in scenarios 3 and 1, the victims are identifiable and 
personally known to the hero, thus concentrating the affective involvement; however in 
scenario 2 the victim is unknown and in both scenarios 4 and 5 there is no immediately 
obvious victim; if respondents are not thinking deliberately, then the sympathy might have 
been predicted to be highest for scenario 3, next for scenario 1, then lower in scenario 2 
and lowest in scenarios 4 and 5 (Small et al., 2007), which was exactly what was found in 
the scores for strength of emotion in this study.  
 
It is possible that perceptions of the risky behaviour are a function of who was going 
to gain from the hero's actions. In scenarios 1, 2 and 3, individuals who were threatened 
were individually identifiable (and in scenarios 1 and 3 were personally known to the hero) 
and might live, be injured or die as a consequence of the hero's actions. Identifiability is 
clearly important in how others perceive these actions (Small and Loewenstein 2003). 
Similarly, the level of baseline risk inherent in the situation, available in brief general 
terms to the respondents, would need to be assessed quickly and specifically by the heroes; 
in scenario 3 (the burning house rescue) a high level of risk relates to an obvious small 
group who will gain from the action, a situation apparently preferred to lower levels of 
baseline risk but a larger population such as scenario 5 might exhibit (VanHoutven 1997).   
 
The notion of saving lives as an attribution for a hero's action is inherently an affective 
one; scenario 3 is described in these terms and also most often as acting on impulse and 
the observer feeling empathy, but not in the comments as being aware of the risk, and was 
rated in the middle on awareness of risk and with a high standard deviation; these are 
interesting as a burning house surely does present an obvious visible risk, perhaps moreso 
than intervening when the assailant has a knife, scenario2 which had a similar awareness 
score. Does real heroism therefore contain an element of being unaware of risk?  Scenario 
3 particularly is one where people can empathise with both the hero and the rescued, and 
although it could not be tested directly, it is possible that the higher the level of empathy 
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with the hero or the rescued, the higher the level of admiration and perceived 
worthwhileness; attribution and cognitive dissonance theories would be consistent with 
this line of explanation (Festinger 1959; Hewstone 1989).  
 
It is possible to view these scenarios using three basic dimensions: cognitive, control 
and affect. Cognitive could mean awareness or risk, locus of control could be individual or 
external environmental and affect might concern whether to invest emotional energy and 
impulsive behaviour. Heroism in scenario 3 might be defined as being low on 
cognition/awareness, high on affect and potentially unknown in terms of control, but 
retrospective justification and would involve acquiring the knowledge of the risks taken 
and thus moving the cognitive element from low to high as part of the post hoc attribution 
process; in addition, such justification can allow a hindsight assessment of the locus of 
control, possibly depending on the outcome so that poor outcomes can be attributed to 
external causes whereas positive outcomes can be attributed internally (Hewstone, 1989). 
If all scenarios were classified according to the three dimensions, they would look very 
different: for example, scenario 4 (off-duty policeman) might be described as being aware 
of the risk, perceived to be in control and acting unemotionally rather than impulsively- 
almost a complete contrast to scenario 3 and therefore perceived by others as much less 
heroic. The level of emotion and impulse was a negative indicator for the two scenarios 
where professionals were involved (the policeman and the fire-fighter) so our respondents 
appear able to differentiate an affect-laden action by a lay person from a cognitively-
determined one by someone we perceive to be just 'doing their job' even though they may 
voluntarily take a huge risk as in scenario 5; this is all consistent with Slovic's (2002) 
emphasis on the role of affect in risk, but we can add that awareness of risk when doing 
your job mitigates the public admiration and even the perceived worthwhileness of the 
action.  
 
It is also possible to classify other non-rational risky behaviours on these three 
dimensions: retaliatory road-rage type behaviours are low on cognition/awareness, high on 
affect and high on individual locus of control; they are also directed at individuals, albeit 
probably not ones personally known to the retaliator. 
 
Many of the comments related to the heroism as ethical hedonism (Glassman and 
Hadad 2004) in the sense that there is some egoism and perhaps some benefits in terms of 
self-esteem and recognition or possible promotion for the professionals. In addition, one 
can consider the principles versus outcome dilemma posited by Schlenker, Weigold and 
Schlenker (2008) where an outcome orientation, perhaps seen here where respondents 
viewed the professionals are merely doing their jobs, differs from a principle orientation 
which relates to morality and ethics. Maybe ethical hedonism and outcome orientation are 
two sides of the same coin. However, the greater number of our respondents saw it as 
saving a life, helping a friend or being a good citizen, which suggests a more general 
perception of genuine altruism, at least for scenarios 1 and 3.  
 
The triangle model of responsibility (Schlenker, Weigold and Schlenker 2008) was 
developed to explain when and why someone becomes engaged with tasks such as in these 
scenarios. However, one of the three prerequisites in the model is that person appears to 
have control over the events. It is interesting therefore that perceived control here, in terms 
of influencing the outcome, is the only rating to show no significant differences between 
the scenarios, including those with professionals as opposed to public or bystanders. This 
implies that any decision tree operated by professionals (Latane and Darley 1970) is no 
different to the affective responses by non-professionals. 
 
Conclusions and implications 
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This paper has investigated a relatively under-researched aspect of heroism- how other 
people perceive it in terms of risk, emotion and to what they make attributions about what 
is happening. Many of the behaviours described in this paper occur without much warning, 
are relatively unpredictable, and contain some emotional or affective responses to a 
particular situation. They may also be considered to be opportunistic in some ways, for 
example heroic acts as presenting an opportunity to impress and look brave.  Heroism as 
an example of a risky non-rational behaviour is potentially understandable in part using the 
three dimensions of cognition-awareness, affect and control, and it would seem that a 
highly affective judgement about identifiable individuals may determine impulsive 
behaviour of this sort more often than a cognitive one in lay people, but the other way 
round for professionals where cognitive judgements may override affective ones.   
 
The notion of affective and cognitive judgements leading to potentially differing 
behaviours is already known in the area of perception of health risk (Leventhal et al. 
1983). Slovic (2002) has demonstrated just how heavily loaded risk perception is with 
affect and emotion. The study here would imply that affect and emotion and the perception 
that the situation is personal are essential to positive public perceptions of heroism, much 
more than are cognitive elements concerning the real amount of risk in a situation.  Social 
amplification of perceived risk may be exacerbated when the situation is personal and 
affected and attenuated when the person is a ‘professional’ risk-taker; these may be further 
amplified or attenuated by selective media reporting (Kasperson et al., 2000). Further 
research into the other domains of retaliation described earlier as examples of impulsive, 
non-rational risky behaviours could shed some light about the extent to which impulsive 
affective judgements can overpower cognitive ones. 
 
It is possible that, in the context of risk, personality interacts with emotion to 
determine behaviour; although there is evidence that anger, aggression and anxiety are 
associated with high-risk behaviours, there is little evidence to show a clear-cut risk-
orientation through the 'big five' personality factors. In this study, there is the suggestion 
that sensation-seeking behaviour is associated with heroism through the desire to appear 
brave and impress others; this is consistent with other findings (Neria et al. 2000). There is 
also a growing literature on emotionality in the workplace and elsewhere; emotional 
intelligence (e.g. Goleman 1998) and similar concepts may be used to attempt to quantify 
some of the elements that could be relevant to risk models. Thus psychometric measures 
of uncertainty avoidance, emotional intelligence and sensation-seeking may shed light 
directly on risk-taking behaviour, in particular risk-seeking and risk-avoiding behaviours.   
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Appendix 
 
Examples of two of the scenarios used 
 
Scenario 1 
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John aged 26 was a fit, athletic, 6 foot tall young man with some previous martial arts experience. During one 
weekend in a rural pub one of his friends got into a fight with another somewhat drunk young man.  Since 
John thought that the situation could get out of hand, he decided to try and to separate the two pushing and 
showing young men.  Unknown to him the drunk young man had a knife hidden in his hand with which he 
slashed John's face badly.  John required 12 stitches, plastic surgery and he still has a visible permanent scar. 
 
The police investigation revealed that the assailant had a high level of alcohol in his blood and that the fight 
started because John's friend accidentally nudged him at the bar trying to order drinks, made him spill his 
drink and was unwilling to buy another drink since only a little bit was spilt.  John's friend apologised but this 
was brushed aside.  The assailant was jailed 15 months for assault and carrying a weapon, since this was not 
the first incident. 
 
 
Scenario 4 
Frank was a police sergeant of 5 years standing with the Metropolitan Police when he was visiting his sister in 
the North.  As he was walking around the neighbourhood one day around 11 o'clock he noticed that two young 
men were acting suspiciously around a car.  Frank came to the conclusion that they were trying to steal the car.  
He went over to them to challenge them, but before he could even say a word one of the two men suddenly 
stabbed him in the chest with a screwdriver, narrowly missing his heart and causing a collapsed lung.  Frank 
was in a critical condition for 3 days in intensive care for 6 and took about 6 months to recover 
 
